The German regional elections this summer once again brought discussions of populism to the forefront of European debate, compounding the anxieties elicited by the results of the French Parliamentary elections and the ongoing spectre of the approaching US Presidential elections. Prime Minister Keir Starmer also centred populism in his speech to the nation at the end of August, addressing the civil unrest which had seen violent rioting and social disorder across England. In each of these democracies, it is the responses and failings of the mainstream parties which have come under scrutiny, a decade on from the beginning of what has become one of the most consequential social and political movements of the 21st Century.

 

Britain, France, and Germany have each had their political cultures transformed by the rise of influential populist groups on both the Left and the Right, which have challenged the dominance of their centre-ground parties and exacerbated the erosion of institutional trust. Our vital ally, the United States, has been even more profoundly affected by the scourge of populism, which has left the nation deeply polarised and dramatically ratcheted up the stakes of its election outcomes. While collective public and elite interest in the political landscapes of each of these four nations has become a voyeuristic pastime, there has been an institutional reluctance to truly grapple with the implications of a long-term populist infrastructure becoming embedded as part of the status quo.

 

Indeed, every vote in which the mainstream parties have clung onto power or managed to live another day tends to be greeted with a sigh of relief and perception of a system-level correction to what is known, trusted, and expected. The threshold for these outcomes appears to be lowering steadily, to the point where dramatic shifts in the fundamental make-up of parliaments and long-term structural changes in strategic outlook can be dismissed as ‘workable’ and less significant than leader-level changes of power. This phenomenon was evident in the manic last-minute scramble amongst allies to support the passing of the Ukraine aid package through the US Congress earlier this year.

 

There are profound consequences of the populist ‘moment’ becoming an established aspect of our allies’ political culture for British foreign policy, both in terms of our direct national and higher interests. The best possible foundation of an ambitious and effective foreign policy in advanced democracies is a stable, prosperous, and cohesive domestic environment, and populism inherently challenges each of these tenets. We can anticipate challenges in several areas, which must be accommodated in our foreign policy-making environments. These issues are most acute when populists seize power, but are increasingly apparent regardless of populists’ formal leadership role, in part because of the outsized accentuating influence of populists on political cultures, and in part because populists reflect broader societal trends and perspectives which are increasingly difficult for mainstream leaders to ignore.

 

First, populist leaders are less inclined to subscribe to traditional allied principles and structures, and historical precedent carries relatively little weight in shaping their views around international cooperation. When in positions of power, they tend to be considerably more transactional and mercantilist in nature, and do not subscribe to the value of collective positioning and messaging on certain issues. This is unfortunate, because these alliance structures and expectations of good faith, mutual reinforcement and defence are one of the most important advantages that advanced democracies hold over authoritarian states.

 

Second, unstable domestic terrains discourage mainstream leaders from attending major international summits and engaging in public diplomacy abroad. When fundamental domestic political and international interests are perceived to be at loggerheads, leaders tend to prioritise their domestic footprint, as such as when President Biden pulled out of a consequential meeting of the Quad leaders in 2022 to address Congressional deadlock over the debt ceiling. This partly reflects a failure of leaders to effectively communicate to their citizens the direct dividends wrought by their engagement with international affairs, in terms of economic growth, energy security, and access to other vital commodities, services and relationships that support the national interest.

 

Third, populist insurgencies may constrain or contort the suite of policy options available to mainstream leaders, which reduces flexibility and undermines collective allied positions. While not all populists are isolationist in their instincts, they tend to impose hard lines of distinction between domestic and international expenditure, and prioritise direct national interest over higher interests. For populists on the Left, this discourages investments in defence spending and participation in military activities abroad. For populists on the Right, this discourages investments in foreign aid, and interventions in the case of humanitarian and human rights violations. The successful mobilisation of both of these groups against these policy options has already made it considerably more difficult for British mainstream leaders to build national consensus on either of these frameworks.

 

Fourth, populist actors in legislative settings tend to be performatively obstructionist, in ways that can fundamentally impede the work of Parliaments. Whether inside or outside mainstream parties, the instinct towards blocking and uncooperative behaviour towards the passage of legislation compels significant resources to be spent on persuasion and making concessions that often diminish the positive impact of the pursued policies. These legislative impasses have immediate and tangible consequences for foreign policy and national security decisions, which often must be made swiftly and decisively.

 

Fifth, the presence of influential populist movements inherently renders national policy environments more opaque and more unpredictable for allies to observe and interpret. The political logic forged in traditional political landscapes where transfers of power move between mainstream parties in the centre ground had a clearly understood set of cues by which external parties could make sense of and anticipate future actions by their allies. This capability is extremely important given the requirement of allies to conduct many of their defensive and foreign policy activities in concert with their partners. Populist actors tend to take decisions and make evaluations based on a considerably more esoteric set of considerations, which may prioritise the consolidation of their political power and other factors over established norms. The speed at which they adjust positions can also dazzle and disrupt allies’ expectations. The implication of these shifts is that allies must invest considerable resources in understanding the positions of their partners and the social as well as political forces that are likely to bear down on their government’s policy choices.

 

It is difficult to see how populism will dissipate, in Britain or anywhere else, as we have such an extensive body of historical evidence that suggests that our modern democracies possess all of the conditions in which it manifests and thrives. We know, for example, that periods of constrained domestic finances and economic shocks tend to support perceptions of ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’ and focus minds on perceptions of fairness and the legitimacy of claims to social goods. We are also living in a time of a great democratic experiment, building societies that are more culturally and ethnically diverse, more empowered and franchised, and more internationally connected than ever, with powerful digital instruments to support collective organisation. Populism is a feature and not an aberration of the hyper-globalisation that was pursued from the end of the 20th Century

 

Another major development over the past decade has been the evolution of protest movements around particular conflicts or issues, such as the marches that took place around the invasion of Iraq in 2003, to the rise of tactical political campaigning and influence operations on specific foreign policy themes. There is no denying the pronounced influence of the so-called European Research Group on the UK’s negotiations with the European Union, and the way in which the subsequently formed China Research Group was able to hold Government’s feet to the fire on embracing a more robust security posture towards China. More recently, the issue of the war in Gaza will now be prosecuted in Parliament by an ‘Independent Alliance’ of MPs elected specifically on this subject in the 2024 General Election.

 

As with populism, the emergence of political campaigning operations is unlikely to dissipate and must be understood by institutions, and all those which assess geopolitical risk, as a significant force with disruptive and decisive potential, and also an anticipated component of the fabric of our political system. Addressing these populist movements is a task that will require careful, consistent and considered work over at least a generation. In the meantime, to move from a reactive position to a posture that meets the realities of these developments, governments, businesses and institutions must invest in significant social and political forecasting capabilities, as an instrument of strategic foresight now central to the business of foreign policy-making.

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