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A Zeitenwende for UK-German Relations

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Sophia Gaston

This briefing addresses the recent investments being made by the Starmer Government in the Anglo-German relationship, and what this means for its wider intentions towards the European Union.

There were clear signs that UK-German relations would be a prominent focus after the UK General Election in July 2024, but the dazzling pace of bilateral engagement in the space of two months has certainly lifted expectations of a fundamental strategic shift.

Sir Keir Starmer has just completed his first trip to Berlin since his Party’s resounding victory last month, following visits from the Foreign and Defence Secretaries promising closer cooperation on defence and security matters. The Prime Minister’s expedition to Germany came directly following a major speech in which he committed his Government to taking “tough decisions” in order to restore the fabric of British society and drive long-term economic prosperity. This framing guided the presentation of his bilateral mission, drumming up investment from major German companies, and promising a ground-breaking new era of cooperation across a complex suite of domains.

The significance of this event therefore extends beyond the anticipated improvements to the bilateral relationship itself, as this is the first definitive effort we have seen from the new Government to coherently forge a narrative between the domestic and international spheres. The integration of these two domains has been one of the most consequential developments of the past decade, and will continue to shape and define the business of government in this Parliamentary term.

On a political level, it always struck me that the Sunak Government, which had a challenging domestic record but a substantive global agenda, failed to grasp the opportunity to focus attentions on its international accomplishments and the benefits they delivered at home. For Starmer, who is preparing the British public for the domestic “pain” of tax rises and tough choices, there is a clear political advantage to assuming an active posture in seeking new forms of investment and supply chains abroad, and forging partnerships that could address intractable issues like the ongoing irregular migration crisis.

It is important to therefore appreciate that the efforts to re-engage with Europe are not simply at the core of this Government’s foreign policy plans, but entirely central to delivering on its domestic agenda. This is the reason why the EU relationship has been pulled from the Foreign Office and into the Cabinet Office, where it can be advanced in a more integrated manner, bringing together economic, regulatory, migration, and geopolitical objectives.

There is some understandable scepticism of the degree to which bilateral relationships can meaningfully contribute to the broader goal of greater cooperation with the European Union, particularly in light of the failures of previous governments to circumvent Brussels in the early stages of the TCA negotiations. With the Single Market and Customs Union still off the table as “red lines” imposed by the Conservatives and upheld by their Labour successors, the major levers by which to return to frictionless trade remain as elusive as ever. Certainly, there should be no expectation that major breakthroughs in the economic relationship that could counter the EU-wide barriers imposed since January 2020 will be achieved at this level.

However, it is vital to recognise the degree to which the political landscape has been fundamentally altered by the passing of the Windsor Framework in early 2023, and now the shift to a firmly pro-European leadership under the Starmer Government. Many of the decisions made by the two sides in the TCA negotiations, and the development of the EU’s arrangements for “third parties”, were informed by political choices, and there is evidence that political will and a posture leaning towards possibilities rather than barriers can achieve significant progress. Most notably, in the UK-France Summit held immediately following the breaking of the Windsor Framework impasse, it was obvious that there was a new willingness to forge mutually beneficial cooperation through a spirit of pragmatism and optimism for the future. This brought immediate dividends for our energy security arrangements, mitigating the disruptive impacts of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on regional energy provision.

We should not be giddy about the possibilities of what can be achieved at a bilateral level, but open to them.

The UK Government has promised an ambitious and wide-ranging Treaty with Germany, spanning well beyond the economic relationship, to also encompass collaboration on research and development, innovation, science, net-zero, and energy resilience. There is a fairly rapid timeline for the Treaty, which is anticipated to be delivered in around six months’ time.

There has been speculation that this timeline reflects the realities of the forthcoming German national elections to be held next year. It is currently anticipated that there will be a new governing coalition after the vote in September 2025, which may see the centre-right Christian Democrats back in power. While it is certainly the case that the relationship between Sir Keir Starmer and Chancellor Olaf Scholz appears to be genuinely warm, there are encouraging prospects for the bilateral relationship over the longer term. There is every indication that Scholz’s possible successors would share the same degree of enthusiasm for the Anglo-German partnership, and indeed, may seek to deepen cooperation in areas such as defence industrial production.

Germany has been through a dramatic transformation in its defence posture over the past two years, however there is a feeling that the Zeitenwende ‘moment’ has lost its momentum and the task of forging an ambitious and sustainable security culture has not yet been achieved. This presents an opportunity for Britain to help guide Germany in the enhanced development of its national security architecture and machinery-of-government. In turn, as the UK faces a major new phase of military modernisation on the back of the forthcoming Strategic Defence Review, there will be ample scope for cooperation with leading German defence primes and cutting-edge SMEs. Projects such as the GCAP fighter jet initiative with Italy and Japan, although beset by some ongoing challenges, make clear that it is entirely possible for Britain to work on a bilateral level with EU Member States on advanced defence projects.

As in the realm of trade, it is at the EU level that the most dramatic shifts could be made on defence industrial production. There is an urgency to these discussions, in light of the considerable ongoing deficits in regional munitions and arms manufacturing needed to adequately support Ukraine, and the questions about the United States’ future commitments to the European theatre. However, forging greater alignment with the bloc’s largest defence funder will certainly not harm the prospects for decisive progress being made on this issue in Brussels in the future. Currently, there are active disincentives for UK firms to participate in the EU’s defence industrial endeavours, particularly in the realm of intellectual property – an unfortunate situation that has been exposed to be entirely unsustainable in light of the UK’s leading role in the defence of Ukraine.

In those early months and even years following the EU Referendum in 2016, some of our partners in Europe revelled in what they perceived to be the UK’s ensuing political dysfunctions and misfortunes. I was always struck by the sombre and regretful tone of German colleagues, who appeared genuinely miserable about Britain’s departure from the EU, in large part because that old feeling of a deeply established cultural camaraderie between the two nations persists. The dynamics in Britain, Germany and Brussels have made it difficult to repair the wounds over the past eight years, but it does feel as though this is the first meaningful opportunity to fundamentally reset relations, and for both sides to build a more confident post-Brexit tenor of engagement. The promised Treaty will undoubtedly include symbolic commitments and new narratives, but we should not dismiss the prospects for genuinely new forms of cooperation, and the impact of putting one another top-of-mind.

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